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CONTRACTUAL DEVICES TO KEEP
"UNDESIRABLES" OUT OF THE
NEIGHBORHOOD
Paul G. Haskellt
Significant actions have been taken in the past two decades at both
the federal and the state level to discourage or to make illegal dis-
crimination in housing on the basis of race, religion, or national origin.
The Supreme Court has held that covenants among landowners
forbidding the sale or rental of property to persons of a particular race
are unenforceable in equity and at law on the ground that judicial
enforcement would be unconstitutional state action.' In the 1950's and
1960's various states enacted legislation making discrimination in the
sale or rental of housing illegal in certain circumstances; these statutes
vary widely with respect to the types of housing covered, the discrim-
inatory activities proscribed, and the sanctions imposed.2 In 1962 the
President issued an Executive Order directing the government depart-
ments and agencies involved to take appropriate steps to prevent dis-
crimination in federally assisted housing.3 Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 directs the departments and agencies involved to take steps
to prevent discrimination in programs, including housing, that are
financially assisted by the federal government.4 There have also been
judicial decisions in the 1950's and 1960's proscribing discrimination in
public housing and in connection with urban renewal. 5
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. A.B. 1948, LL.B. 1951, Harvard
University.
I Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See
also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), in which the Court held that a racially restrictive
covenant in the District of Columbia could not be enforced by federal courts because of
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and on public policy grounds. In Capitol Fed.
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 136 Colo. 265, 316 P.2d 252 (1957), a racially restrictive
deed provision, violation of which would cause forfeiture of title, was held to be invalid
on constitutional grounds. But see Park & Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311,
88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956), for a different result on similar facts.
2 For a summary of the various state laws, see U.S. HOUSING & HOME FINANCE AGENCY,
FAIR HOUSING LAws: SUMMARIES AND TEXT OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL LAws (1964); Pearl &
Terner, Fair Housing Laws: Halfway Mark, 54 GEo. L.J. 156 (1965); Pearl & Terner, Sur-
vey: Fair Housing Laws-Design for Equal Opportunity, 16 STAN. L. REv. 849 (1964).
8 Exec. Order No. 11063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1962), 42 US.C. § 1982nt (1964). The Federal
Housing Administration issued regulations pursuant to the order. 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.300 -.355
(1968).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1964). The Housing and Home Finance Agency issued
regulations pursuant to this legislation. 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.12 (1968).
5 E.g., Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964); Heyward v.
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Subject to certain exceptions, the Civil Rights Act of 1968 pro-
hibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. One exception
is, broadly stated, that the individual homeowner may discriminate in
the sale or rental of his property if he does not use a real estate broker
in the transaction.6 In 1968 the Supreme Court held that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in the
sale or rental of property.7
It is evident, however, that the principle that every person should
be entitled to purchase or to rent housing of his choice if he has the
price, regardless of his color, religion, or national origin, is not ac-
cepted by a significant number of Americans, despite the recent
judicial, legislative, and executive actions. Anyone who has talked with
"majority group" neighbors on this subject, or who has been involved
in fair housing activities, is aware of the extent of opposition to this
principle. Some opponents bluntly state that they do not want certain
"undesirables" in the neighborhood, while others maintain, in effect,
that an owner should be entitled to offer his house on a discriminatory
basis because it is an integral part of his property interest. The over-
whelming approval by the electorate in 1964 of the proposed amend-
ment to the California constitution to bar fair housing legislation,8 and
Public Housing Admin., 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956); Detroit Housing Comm'n v. Lewis,
226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955). For discussions of the question of federal governmental in-
volvement in housing and the discrimination issue, see Grier, The Negro Ghettos and
Federal Housing Policy, 82 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 550 (1967); Sloane, Housing Discrimina-
tion-The Response of Law, 42 N.C.L. REv. 106 (1968); Note, Uncle Tom's Multi-Cabin
Subdivision-Constitutional Restrictions on Racial Discrimination by Developers, 53 CoR-
NELL L. Rxv. 314 (1968); Note, Nondiscrimination Implications of Federal Involvement in
Housing, 19 VANro. L. Rxv. 865 (1966).
6 Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 803(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 3603(b) (Supp. 1969). Prior
to December 81, 1968 the Act prohibited discrimination in certain' federally assisted
housing. Broadly stated, after December 31, 1968 and to December 31, 1969, the Act pro-
hibits discrimination in all housing except the noncommercial sale or rental of the single-
family home; after December 81, 1969 the Act prohibits discrimination in all housing
except the noncommercial sale or rental of the single-family home if the sale or rental
is made without the services of a broker, and except in the roominghouse or small
apartment house occupied in part by the owner.
7 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). This case and the statute involved
render unlawful discrimination in housing based on race, and do not concern discrimina-
tion based on religion or national origin. Id. at 413. So the 1866 Act is narrower in this
respect than the Civil Rights Act of 1968. But it is broader than the 1968 Act in that it
allows for no exceptions in racial discrimination.
8 The vote was 4,526,460 to 2,395,747. The California Supreme Court held in Mulkey
v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 418 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966), that the amendment
was unconstitutional, and this holding was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Reitman v. Mulkey, 887 U.S. 869 (1967). The reasoning of the courts was that this
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the opposition to fair housing evidenced in referenda in several
municipalities in recent years, 9 seem to confirm this conclusion. There
is every reason to believe that there will be continued resistance to the
implementation of the principle of equality of opportunity in housing.
Although twenty years have passed since Shelley v. Kraemer,10
various deed provisions of a restrictive nature, which on their face are
not affected by that case, continue to be used for the purpose of con-
trolling the type of person who can buy in the neighborhoods to which
they apply. I am referring to deed provisions that forbid the owner to
sell or to lease without consent of the developer or the homeowners'
association established to police the development, or that forbid the
sale or lease of property without the consent of homeowners in the
neighborhood, or that forbid the sale or lease to anyone who is not
accepted for membership in a particular club or development associa-
tion, or that grant to the developer, homeowners' association, club, or
neighbors the option to purchase in the event the owner chooses to
sell. Such provisions may make no reference to any racial, religious, or
ethnic qualification for ownership or use, but the composition of many
of the neighborhoods in which they are employed leads one to infer
that the purpose, at least in part, is to impose qualifications of such a
nature. Proof of such discrimination may, however, be difficult and
expensive. By such means the impact of Shelly v. Kraemer has been
blunted. And there is good reason to expect that such means will con-
tinue to be used for the purpose of blunting the impact of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as recently con-
strued by the Supreme Court."
After Shelley, the homeowner who was subject to one of these
racially neutral restrictive devices was personally free to discriminate
in the sale of his home. However, even if he did not choose to dis-
action would significantly encourage and involve the State of California in private dis-
crimination. Justices Harlan, Black, Clark, and Stewart dissented.
9 Berkeley, California; Tacoma and Seattle, Washington; Akron and Dayton, Ohio;
and Detroit, Michigan. See discussion in Miller, Anti-Open Occupancy Legislation: An
Historical Anomaly, 43 U. DEr. LJ. 165 (1965); Pearl & Terner, Fair Housing Laws: Half-
way Mark, 54 GEo. L.J. 156, 166 (1965); Sauer, Free Choice in Housing, 10 N.Y.L.F. 525,
544 (1964).
10 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
11 The use of such devices for discriminatory purposes is discussed in G. LEFCOE,
LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW 1086-87 (1966); McDermott, The Effects of the Rule in the
Modern Shelley's Case, 13 U. PiTT. L. REv. 647, 661-64 (1952); Ming, Racial Restrictions
and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 203,
219-21 (1949); Note, Constitutional Law: Circumvention of the Rule Against Enforcement
of Racially Restrictive Covenants, 37 CALiF. L. RFv. 493 (1949).
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criminate, the restrictive device prevented or at least discouraged him
from selling to an "undesirable" if the neighbors wished to exercise
their control over his sale for that purpose. Also, if the homeowner
wished to discriminate without assuming personal responsibility for it,
he could hide behind the veto of his neighbors. Similarly, under the
law as it exists today, the restrictive device can serve as a check upon
the person who wishes to comply with the law and as a shield for the
person who wishes to circumvent the law.
This article will examine the legality and social significance of
these restrictive contractual devices' 2 and the ethical implications for
lawyers of drafting land restrictions that are known to be unenforce-
able but which are included to deter conduct that cannot legally be
controlled.
I
STATE OF Tm LAW
The legality of these contractual restrictive devices is considered
primarily under the heading of direct restraints on alienation, 13 and,
to a limited extent, under the heading of perpetuities. 14
A direct restraint on alienation occurs when the instrument of
transfer of property provides that the transferee cannot alienate, or that
12 I refer to these devices as "contractual" throughout this article. Certainly this is
not technically accurate for all situations involving these devices. The disabling restraint
is not contractual. The forfeiture restraint may not involve any contractual aspect; it may
consist of only a property relationship such as that of defeasible fee and right of entry,
for example. The purpose of using the word "contractual" is to distinguish what this
article is about from the varieties of nonconsensual discriminatory techniques used by
some real estate people and by the individual homeowner.
13 The most readable full treatment of this subject is 3 L. SImEs & A. SMrrH, THE
LAW OF FrruRE IrrmESrs §§ 1101-71 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as Simas & SMITH].
See also 6 AMEICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.1-.132 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter
cited as AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY]; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 404-17 (1944) [here-
inafter cited as REsTATEmENT]. For a readable brief treatment, see 6 R. POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY 1 839-48 (P. Rohan ed. 1968). See also Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Con-
cerning Direct Restraints on Alienation, 57 MICH. L. Rxv. 1173 (1959); Manning, The
Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray, 48 HARv. L. Rxv. 373 (1935);
Schnebly, Restraints upon the Alienation of Legal Interests, 44 YALE L.J. 961 (1935);
Note, Restraints on the Involuntary Alienation of Legal Interests, 54 HARv. L. Rxv. 466
(1941).
14 Probably the most readable full treatment of this subject is 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 24.1-.118. See also RESTATE ENT §§ 370-403; 3 SIMES 8- SMITH §§ 1211-1468.
For brief treatments of this subject, see T. BERCIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES
IN LAND AND FUTURE INTEREsTs 183-229 (1966); L. SIMEs, FUTuRE INTERESTS §§ 120-50 (2d
ed. 1966); Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638 (1938).
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any alienation by the transferee shall cause the title to revert to the
transferor or to pass to a third party, or that the transferee promises
that he will not alienate, or that if the transferee decides to alienate he
shall offer first to the transferor or a third party.
The restraint that flatly denies to the transferee the power to
transfer purports to deprive the transferee of one of the characteristic
attributes of ownership, namely the power of disposition. This is known
as a disabling restraint. The disabling restraint is almost universally
held to be invalid; the transfer of title that contains the restraint is
valid, but the restraint clause is nullity. So the transferee may freely
dispose of the property as if the disabling clause were not there.'5
The restraint providing that if the transferee alienates the title
shall revert to the transferor or pass to a third party is known as a
forfeiture restraint. Technically the transferee is not deprived of his
power to dispose which is characteristic of ownership; instead, the
alienation will or may trigger the forfeiture of title to the transferor or
to some third party. The restraint clause may be a special limitation
which will cause the title to revert to the transferor automatically
without any action being taken by the transferor, an executory limita-
tion which will cause the title to pass automatically to a third party, or
a condition subsequent in which case the forfeiture of title will depend
upon the optional exercise of the right of entry by the transferor.
Traditional learning in the field of future interests makes no provision
for the equivalent of the optional right of entry by the third party
holder of the executory interest, but there seems to be no reason why
such a right could not be recognized if the restraint clause clearly
expressed that intention.
The forfeiture restraint, when attached to a fee interest, is usually
held to be invalid, regardless of whether the restraint is to last in-
definitely, or for the life of a person, or for a period of years. The
transfer of title is valid but the forfeiture restraint is a nullity.16 How-
ever, the forfeiture restraint attached to the conveyance of a life
estate or an estate for years is normally held to be validY7 It should be
noted that the forfeiture restraint that attaches to the fee has been held
15 RxsTATEMENT § 405; 3 SIrEs & SMITH §§ 1136-46. The principal exception to the
rule that the disabling restraint is invalid is the spendthrift trust, valid in most American
jurisdictions. This is a disabling restraint on the alienation of an equitable interest. Also,
a disabling restraint which prohibits one cotenant of a legal interest in land from com-
pelling partition has been held to be valid in certain circumstances. RESTATEMENT § 405;
3 Simts & SMiTH § 1146.
16 RESTATEMENT § 406; 3 SIMEs & SMITH §§ 1147-60.
17 RE TATEmENT §§ 409-10; 3 SIMFrs & SMrrH §§ 1157-58.
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to be valid where it is of a limited nature, such as a restraint that im-
poses forfeiture only if the sale is made to a member of a small group.18
The restraint providing that the transferee promises not to alien-
ate is known as a promissory restraint. The transferee technically is not
deprived of his power of disposition as he is in the case of the disabling
restraint. Rather, the transferee has promised that he will not transfer.
If he breaks his promise, he may be subject to an action at law for
damages or to an action in equity for injunctive relief. The law with
respect to the promissory restraint is essentially the same as that of the
forfeiture restraint. The promissory restraint that attaches to the fee
interest, regardless of the duration of the period of the restraint, is
usually held to be invalid.19 If the restraint is qualified, such as one
which prohibits alienation only to a small group but otherwise allows
the transferee to alienate freely, the promissory restraint may be valid
although attached to a fee.20 The promissory restraint that is attached
to the life estate or the estate for years is usually valid.21
Relating this discussion to the restrictive devices with which this
article is concerned, a provision that the consent of the grantor or some
third party is necesary for any subsequent transfer, or that any subse-
quent transferee must be a member of a certain organization, has
usually been treated by the courts as the equivalent of the absolute
promissory, disabling, or forfeiture prohibition upon transfer. The
promise is more often than not the form of restraint today where a
deed is the instrument of transfer. The covenant not to sell without
the consent of another where consent can be arbitrarily withheld, and
the covenant not to sell to anyone not a member of a particular or-
ganization where membership can be arbitrarily withheld, are substan-
tially the same as the covenant not to sell that does not contain any
qualification.2
18 3 SIMn & SMITH § 1151. RESTATEmENT § 406 provides:
Subject to the exception stated in § 413(1) (preemptive provision), a restraint
on the alienation of a legal possessory estate in fee simple which is, or but for the
restraint would be, indefeasible is valid if, and only if,
(a) the restraint is a promissory restraint or a forfeiture restraint, and
(b) the restraint is qualified so as to permit alienation to some though not
all possible alienees, and
(c) the restraint is reasonable under the circumstances, and
(d) if the restraint is a forfeiture restraint, the requirements of the rule
against perpetuities are satisfied.
19 3 SIMEs & SMrrH §9 1161, 1167.
20 The promissory restraint has usually been treated in the same manner as the for-
feiture restraint. RES.ATr ENT § 406 (quoted in note 18 supra); 3 SiMsas & SMrrH § 1161.
21 6 PowErL, supra note 13, 844.
22 See Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio, 156 Md. 229, 114 A. 245 (1929); Mountain
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The restraint providing that if the transferee chooses to alienate.
he must first offer to the transferor or some third party is usually
described as a preemption. The principal factor in the determination
of the validity of this form of restraint is the price at which the owner
must sell or offer to sell to the holder of the preemptive right of pur-
chase. If the price set forth in the preemption provision is the market
price at the time the owner chooses to sell, then the preemption is
probably valid.23 If, however, the price set forth in the preemption
provision is a fixed price, then the preemption has been held to be
invalid.24 But there is significant authority to the effect that the pre-
emption at a fixed price is valid if the preemption is reasonable con-
sidering all the circumstances. 25 The preemption provision is likely to
take the form of a promise to offer, but it can take that of a condition,
the breach of which results in forfeiture of title, or that of a disabling
restraint.
The law with respect to perpetuities has a rather limited relation
to restrictive devices aimed at "undesirables." The law dealing with
perpetuities has sometimes been described as concerning indirect re-
straints on alienation. The common law rule against perpetuities pro-
vides that no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.
This is not the place to go into the complexities of this area of the law,
but it should be noted that the rule relates only to the question of the
vesting in interest of legal and equitable future interests in personalty
and realty. If the future interest created violates the rule against
perpetuities, it is invalid and excised from the disposition, and the
other interests created in the disposition take effect as if the invalid
future interest were never created.26 The common law rule against
Springs Ass'n v. Wilson, 81 N.J. Super. 564, 196 A.2d 270 (Ch. 1963); Lauderbaugh v. Wil-
liams, 409 Pa. 351, 186 A.2d 39 (1962); Pritchett v. Badgett, 257 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953); RESTATEMENT § 406, comment h; 3 SIMES & SMITH § 1153.
23 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.67; 3 SiMEs & SMITH § 1154. For a broad dis-
cussion of preemptions, see Boyer & Spiegel, Land Use Control: Pre-emptions, Perpetuities,
and Similar Restraints, 20 U. MIAMI L. REv. 148 (1965).
24 6 POWELL, supra note 13, § 842.
25 Hall v. Crocker, 192 Tenn. 506, 241 S.W.2d 548 (1951); Kamas State Bank v. Bour-
geois, 14 Utah 2d 188, 380 P.2d 931 (1963).
26 It has occasionally been held that the entire disposition is invalid if excising of
the invalid future interest has the effect of distorting the entire dispositive plan. This
result is sometimes described as "infectious invalidity." See discussion in 6 AMERICAN
LAw OF PROPERTY § 24.48. Several states have adopted the principle that the otherwise
invalid future interest is to be reformed by the court as necessary to bring it within the
limits of the rule. Also, several states have adopted the principle that validity of the
future interest is to be determined by actual events rather than on the basis of possible
[Vol. 54:524
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perpetuities, with modern qualifications, is in effect in a large majority
of the jurisdictions. 27
The rule has been held applicable to the preemption. The pre-
emptive right of purchase is considered to be a contingent future
interest in the property involved. So the preemption is subject to the
rule against perpetuities as well as the law of direct restraints on
alienation; if it violates either, it is invalid.28 The rule against per-
petuities is also applicable to the forfeiture restraint for the benefit of
a third party. However, the rule is not applicable to the forfeiture
restraint for the benefit of the transferor or his successors; the rule has
no application to the right of entry or the possibility of reverter. If
forfeiture for the benefit of the third party may occur beyond the
period of the rule, such forfeiture is invalid. If forfeiture must occur,
if it occurs at all, within the period of the rule, the restraint may, of
course, still be invalid if it violates the rules with respect to direct
restraints on alienation. 29 The rule against perpetuities has no applica-
events as prospectively viewed from the time of creation of the interest. For brief dis-
cussions of these modern trends, see BERGIN & HAsK.r, supra note 14, at 218-23; SiMEs,
supra note 14, §§ 128-31. Many articles have been written on these modern reforms, of
which the following are broadly representative: Browder, Construction, Reformation, and
the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1963); Leach, Perpetuities in Perspec-
tive: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REv. 721 (1952); Lynn, Perpetuities
Reform: An Analysis of Developments in England and the United States, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 508 (1965); Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and See"
Doctrine, 52 Mxcir. L. REv. 179 (1953).
27 For a state by state survey of the rule, see 2 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRusr J. 176
(1967).
It appears that the original social purpose of the rule was to place some limit upon
the creation of future interests in order to prevent land from being removed from com-
merce for an inordinate period of time. Until relatively recent times, the future interest
was usually a legal interest in land. Creation of future interests in land had the effect
of making the fee inalienable. For a brief and lucid discussion of the historical and cur-
rent rationale for the rule against perpetuities, see 3 Snmus & SMrrH §§ 1211-34. An ex-
tended scholarly discussion of the history and purposes of the rule appears in Edgerly
v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891). Most future interests today, of course, are equi-
table interests under a trust with the trustee having a power of sale over the assets, which
are usually stocks and bonds; the modem function of the rule against perpetuities ob-
viously has little to do with alienability of assets. It seems that its present function is
simply that of setting some limit upon the period within which an individual can dictate
the use, investment, and devolution of a quantum of wealth. See also L. SIMEs, PUBLIC
POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 59 (1955).
28 3 SiMF.s & SMrrH § 1154; Boyer & Spiegel, supra note 23, at 161. See also Gearhart
v. West Lumber Co., 212 Ga. 25, 90 S.E.2d 10 (1955); Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 177
S.W.2d 568 (1944); Roberts v. Jones, 307 Mass. 504, 30 N.E.2d 892 (1940).
29 The exemption of the right of entry and the possibility of reverter from operation
of the rule against perpetuities seems to be an historical anomaly. See 6 AEmmUCAN LAw
or PRoPERTY § 24.62, at 156. Several states have placed statutory time limits, such as
1969]
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tion to the disabling restraint or the promissory restraint (other than
one in preemption form). This is because such restraints do not involve
future interests. Rather, they are attempted controls over the alienation
of property by means of qualifying the nature of the transferee's owner-
ship, in the case of the disabling restraint, and by means of a promise,
in the case of the promissory restraint. No one becomes entitled to a
possessory interest in the land by virtue of the violation of the restraint
provision where such restraints are involved. 0
The relationship of the restrictive devices to the statutory rule
against suspension of the power of alienation that exists in several
jurisdictions deserves brief examination. In some states, this rule exists
in lieu of the rule against perpetuities; 8 1 in New York, both rules
exist.82 Despite the verbal similarity, the rule against suspension of the
power of alienation and the body of law dealing with direct restraints
on alienation are distinct and independent.
The rule against suspension of the power of alienation is not con-
cerned with vesting of a contingent future interest, or whether there
is an express provision restricting the power to alienate, but rather
with the ability of the owners of present and future interests to join to
convey a fee simple absolute in possession. For example, if a testator
devises "Blackacre to B in fee, but if the premises are ever used for
commercial purposes, then to C in fee," the executory interest in C
violates the rule against perpetuities, but there is no violation of the
rule against the suspension of the power of alienation because at any
time B and C can join to convey a fee simple absolute to D.83
A future interest in unascertained or unborn persons necessarily
80 years, upon the duration of these interests. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-97 (1960);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 184A, § 3 (1955). Forfeiture restraints are likely to involve the
right of entry or the possibility of reverter, rather than the executory interest, and con-
sequently impact of the rule against perpetuities is not as great as it might otherwise be.
The preemption is frequently in favor of the grantor also, but it has not been placed
in the same category as the right of entry and the possibility of reverter for perpetuities
purposes; i.e., it is not exempted from operation of the rule despite the fact it is for the
benefit of the grantor.
80 The rule against perpetuities is a rule against remoteness of vesting of future
interests. A future interest is an interest in specific property that does not presently entitle
the holder to possession or enjoyment but which may or will entitle the holder to posses-
sion or enjoyment at some later time. The promise by the fee owner that he will not
convey gives the promisee some control over the property, but does not entitle the promisee
to possession or enjoyment at some future time. The promise to offer to the promisee if
the promisor fee owner decides to sell may entitle the promisee to possession in the future.
81 E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-111 (1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.13 (1947); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 280.14-.15 (1957).
32 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw §§ 42-43 (McKinney 1967).
88 See 5 PowELL, supra note 13, § 792(4); SPIAs, supra note 14, § 137, at 301.
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suspends the power of alienation of the fee. But the rule against suspen-
sion of the power of alienation usually allows the same period for
suspension as the rule against perpetuities allows for vesting, namely
lives in being plus twenty-one years.34
The disabling restraint would normally run afoul of the rule
against suspension of the power of alienation. However, in the case of
the disabling restraint requiring the consent of some other party for
alienation, the power of alienation is not suspended because aliena-
tion of the fee can be effected with the consent of that other party.
This is somewhat academic, of course, since the disabling restraint
is almost invariably invalid as a direct restraint on alienation. The
promissory restraint does not violate the rule against suspension of the
power of alienation because the promisee can always release his promis-
sory control for the purpose of conveying the fee. Nor does the for-
feiture restraint violate the rule because the holder of the future
interest that has the benefit of the forfeiture can always release his
interest or join with the holder of the qualified fee to convey a fee
simple absolute. The preemption restraint does not violate the rule
because the holder of the preemption can release his right of purchase
for the purpose of conveying a fee simple absolute. It is theoretically
possible for the holder of these various interests to be unascertainable
for a period of time, thereby suspending the power of alienation be-
yond the period allowed under the rule,3 5 but this possibility is ex-
tremely remote.
Thus, the restrictive devices face the obstacles of the law concern-
ing direct restraints on alienation pervasively and the common law rule
against perpetuities where a future interest is involved, but for all
practical purposes the rule against suspension of the power of aliena-
tion is of no concern.
A. Organization Membership Restraint
Organization membership as a qualification for acquisition of
title was considered recently by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
34 E.g., MONT. R.v. CODES ANN. §§ 67-406, -407 (1962); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-27
(1960); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 42-43 (McKinney 1967) (prior to 1958 the permissible
period in New York was two lives plus the minority of an infant in certain circumstances).
36 E.g., A conveys to B in fee, subject to preemption at fixed price in first son of A
to reach age 30, such preemptive right to be exercisable in the event B or his successors
should wish to sell at any time after such son should reach age 30. A has no children at
time of conveyance.
For a good discussion of the relationship between the rule against direct restraints
and the rule against suspension of the power of alienation, see Norvell, The Power of
Alienation: Direct Restraint v. Suspension, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 894 (1956).
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Lauderbaugh v. Williams.386 A developer began selling lots along the
shore of a lake in 1949. In 1951 the developer and those who had pur-
chased lots to that time entered into an agreement that provided in
part as follows:
The First Parties [developer], for themselves, their heirs and as-
signs, agree that membership in the Lake Watawga Association
shall be a condition precedent for future purchasers of land along
the shore of Lake Watawga; that in the event such prospective
purchasers qualify as members as aforesaid, the First Parties will,
upon payment of purchase price, execute and deliver to them
deeds.37
The bylaws of the Lake Watawga Association provided that a two-
thirds vote of the board of directors was required for membership, and
that objection to membership by three members, if the membership
was more than ten, or by one member, if the membership was less than
ten, would block admission.
In 1958 the developer brought an action to remove a cloud on the
title of her land by seeking to have the agreement restricting the sale
to members of the association declared void. In 1960 certain owners
brought an action against the developer and purchasers from the
developer who were not members of the association to set aside the
deed to such purchasers, and to enjoin the developer from conveying
land along the lake shore except to persons approved for membership
in the association. The cases were tried together. The trial court up-
held the agreement, set aside the deed in question, and enjoined the
developer from selling in violation of the agreement. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania reversed the trial court on the ground that the
association membership requirement was an unreasonable restraint
upon alienation. The court noted the standardless control over aliena-
tion that the association exercised under the agreement and the associ-
ation bylaws:
We do not seek to impugn the motives of the members of the
Association and, for the purposes of deciding the issues presented,
assume that their motives are of the purest, their sole concerns
being the orderly development of the area and, quite properly, the
protection of their investments. . . . [T]he fact remains that no
standards for admission to the Asociation are set out in its by-laws
and it is possible that three members by whim, caprice or for any
reason, good or bad, or for no reason, could deny membership to
86 409 Pa. 351, 186 A.2d 39 (1962).
37 Id. at 353-54, 186 A.2d at 40.
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any prospective alienee, thereby depriving Mrs. Lauderbaugh
[developer] of her right to alienate her land.38
In Mountain Springs Association v. Wilson,39 plaintiff home-
owners' association brought an action against certain owners in the
development for construction and determination of the rights and
liabilities of plaintiff and defendants under certain covenants contained
in the deeds to the property in the development. One covenant in
issue provided in part "that the party of the second part [grantee] will
not sell, rent or lease the aforesaid premises or any building thereon,
except to a member of the Mountain Springs Association . ". .. ,0Cer-
tain lots were sold by the developer to a party who subsequently sold to
defendants, who refused to become members of the plaintiff association.
Plaintiff contended that the sale to such non-members was a violation
of the covenant and that their refusal to join also constituted a viola-
tion. The court held that the covenant limiting sales to members of
the association was invalid as an unreasonable restraint upon aliena-
tion:
An examination of the constitution and bylaws shows that
there is no standard set up for admission to the Association. Thus,
it is possible that three trustees by whim, caprice or for any reason,
good or bad, or for no reason, could deny membership to any
prospective alienee. If a property owner desired to sell his property
and no member of the Association desired to purchase the same,
the Association through its board of trustees could forever pre-
clude him from disposing of his property to another by the simple
device of refusing to admit the prospective purchaser as a mem-
ber ....
Under the law generally prevailing throughout the country, a
deed which vests in the grantee the title in fee cannot validly
impose, either as a condition or as a simple provision, a restraint
against alienation to anyone other than some person or persons
designated, or those of a class.4 '
In Wayne Lakes Park, Inc. v. Warner,42 plaintiff developer
brought an action against certain landowners in the development to
restrain them from occupying the premises during such time as mem-
bership in a recreational park operated by plaintiff was not main-
tained. One of the covenants in the deeds provided that the owner of
38 Id. at 355-56, 186 A.2d at 41.
39 81 N.J. Super. 564, 196 A.2d 270 (Ch. 1963).
40 Id. at 569, 196 A.2d at 273.
41 Id. at 573-74, 196 A.2d at 276.
42 104 Ohio App. 167, 147 N.E.2d 269 (1957).
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the premises "shall, at all times, maintain an annual membership in
Wayne Lakes Park operated by the grantor .... ."43 The acceptance of
membership and the fixing of the fees therefor were wholly within
the control of plaintiff developer. The trial court denied relief and
dismissed the petition. The appellate court, affirming the judgment of
the trial court, stated:
Plaintiff has attempted to limit defendants' rights of owner-
ship and occupancy by the requirement of membership in an
organization subject to the control of plaintiff. The devastating
consequences which might flow from such a condition ... render
it irreconcilable with and repugnant to the conveyance of a fee
simple tite.44
The court recognized that defendants could be denied use of recrea-
tional facilities of the park, but control over ownership of the land
was contrary to public policy as an unreasonable restraint upon alien-
ation.
The cases involving organization membership as a condition to
ownership are few in number but, with the exception of one distinc-
tive case,45 they all hold such form of restraint invalid. The require-
ment of membership without a reasonable and objective standard for
determining membership places in a handful of individuals a veto
power over transferability of land.46 And if the membership is re-
43 Id. at 169, 147 N.E2d at 271.
44 Id. at 172, 147 N.E2d at 273.
45 In Resnick v. Croton Park Colony, Inc., 3 Misc. 2d 109, 151 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct.
1955), plaintiff (homeowner and member of defendant membership corporation) brought
an action to determine the effect of certain provisions in the deed from defendant. One
provision of the deed was that plaintiff could sell only to a member of defendant member-
ship corporation. Section 22 of the N.Y. Mzr.zmasnn' CoREs. LAW (McKinney 1941) pro-
vided as follows:
A membership corporation, if its by-laws so provide, and pursuant to the pro-
visions thereof, and without leave of the court, may convey to a member of the
corporation a portion of its real property for the erection thereupon of a cottage
or other dwelling-house with suitable outbuildings. When so conveyed the title
to such portion, together with the buildings thereon, shall continue in such mem-
ber and on his death pass to his heirs or devisees, but the land shall not be alien-
able except to the corporation or to a member thereof.
The court upheld the validity of the restraint on alienation as authorized by the
statute. The statute reflects the special and limited purposes of the membership corpora-
tion. Section 21 of the MEMBERSHiP CoREs. LAw (McKinney 1941) forbids generally the
conveyance by a membership corporation of real property without court approval. The
statutory authorization of the organization membership restraint was not considered to
involve any breach of the New York Constitution.
46 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Conover v. Packanack Lake
Country Club & Community Ass'n, 94 N.J. Super. 275, 228 A.2d 78 (App. Div. 1967);
Tuckerton Beach Club v. Bender, 91 N.J. Super. 167, 219 A.2d 529 (App. Div. 1966).
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stricted on a racial or religious basis, such restraint on alienation is
also unenforceable on both constitutional47 and statutory grounds. 48
B. Consent Restraint
Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio49 is the leading case dealing
with the question of the legal effect of a covenant that the grantee of a
fee must obtain consent of the grantor or some third person in order
to convey. In 1927 defendant developer conveyed by deed containing
the following covenant:
And for the purpose of maintaining the property hereby conveyed
and the surrounding property as a desirable high class residential
section ... no owner of the land hereby conveyed shall have the
47 In Harris v. Sunset Islands Property Owners, 116 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1959), plaintiff
association of homeowners brought an action to compel defendant owner to vacate and
sell property subject to a covenant that property could be sold only to persons who were
members of plaintiff association. Defendant was Jewish, and at the time of his purchase
the bylaws of plaintiff association prohibited membership by Jews. Defendant was never
a member. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the restraint was unreasonable and
that enforcement would be violative of the fourteenth amendment.
There can be little doubt that if the racially or religiously neutral membership re-
straint can be proved to have been used as a subterfuge to discriminate on racial or
religious grounds, such restraint'is unenforceable on constitutional grounds. See Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US. 356 (1885).
48 Civil Rights Act of 1968, §§ 801-19, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-19 (Supp. 1969); OHiO
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01(M), 4112.02(H)(8) (Page Supp. 1968) (unlawful to include, honor,
or exercise an organization membership restraint or a consent restraint for the purpose
of racial or religious discrimination); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
In Newbem v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., Civ. No. 6871 (S.D. Ohio, March 12, 1969), Newbern,
a Negro, obtained a permanent injunction restraining the developer from discriminating
in sales on the basis of race. The action was based on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra;
the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 that would have caught this discrimination was
not then in force. The developer required as a condition of sale that the prospective
purchaser be accepted for membership in a homeowner's association which operated
recreational facilities. The homeowner's association was the "alter ego" of the developer
corporation. There was no explicit racial exclusion policy. The court order provided, in
part:
8. Until such time as the defendants, Lake Lorelei, Inc., and Lorelei Property
Owners Association, have adopted and published objective standards for the de-
termination of admission to membership in the Association and same have been
approved by this Court... the defendants are directed to delete from their pro-
posed contract (offer) form the entire paragraph dealing with membership (a
paragraph dealing only with dues may be used instead). Until such time, the
defendants will cease entirely the use of any form . . . or any advertising which
refers to "membership in the Association" as being a condition of purchase and
sale. Until such standards be so adopted and approved, the authority of the...
Association, Lake Lorelei, Inc., its Trustees, Executive Committee, and Special
Executive Committee to determine membership is suspended and will not be
exercised.
49 156 Md. 229, 144 A. 245 (1929).
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right to ,sell or rent the same without the written consent of the
grantor herein which shall have the right to pass upon the charac-
ter desirability and other qualifications of the proposed purchaser
or occupant of the property until January 1, 1952 .... 50
In 1928 the grantee contracted to sell the lot to plaintiff "subject
however to the residential restrictions prevailing in Ashburton [the
development]."' Defendant developer refused to consent to the sale,
and the vendor did not convey. Plaintiff then sued the vendor and the
developer to compel specific performance of the contract of sale with-
out the consent of the developer, on the theory that the covenant
requiring consent was void. The Maryland Court of Appeals held
that the covenant was an illegal restraint upon alienation:
In practical effect the reservation in the deed before us would
give the grantor company unqualified control for a term of years
over the disposition of the property by sale or lease. The recital
that the purpose of the restriction is to maintain "a desirable high
class residential section" and to enable the grantor "to pass upon
the character desirability and other qualifications of the proposed
purchaser or occupant" was evidently designed to explain rather
than to limit the reservation of the power to forbid a transfer of
the property by the grantees to any purchaser or lessee who failed
to conform, in the opinion of the grantor's officers, to those in-
definite standards. The existence of such a discretionary control
would be plainly incompatible with the freedom of alienation,
which is one of the characteristic incidents of a fee simple title.5 2
In Wiesenthal v. Young 3 the deed from plaintiffs to defendants
contained a covenant to the effect that defendants would not sell,
transfer, or lease any part of the land conveyed for a period of two
years. This covenant was followed by the statement that the "restric-
tion... may be waived by the grantors"5 4 on payment by the grantees
of one thousand dollars. Defendants sold within two years without
obtaining the waiver. Plaintiffs subsequently offered to give the
waiver, but when defendants refused to pay for it, plaintiffs brought
suit for one thousand dollars. The Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court held for the defendants:
The restriction . . . gave the grantors the right to waive it if
they saw fit but the grantees could not compel such waiver. The
50 Id. at 231, 144 A. at 245.
51 Id. at 232, 144 A. at 245.
52 Id. at 234-35, 144 A. at 246-47.
53 280 App. Div. 590, 116 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1st Dep't 1952).
54 Id. at 591, 116 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
[Vol. 54:524
CONTRACTUAL DEVICES
restriction in the deed is a bar for a period of two years to the
sale, transfer or lease of any portion of the real estate and as such
is void. Reason, controlling authority and public policy forbid
restraints upon the disposition of property deeded in fee.55
The consent restraint occasionally appears in a devise. In Pritchett
v. Badgett56 the will contained a devise of a fee simple to plaintiff and
provided that plaintiff devisee "shall not be permitted to sell said land
nor encumber same for a period of twenty (20) years unless joined by
the executors hereinafter named, or either of them that might be
surviving." 57 Plaintiff devisee brought an action for construction of the
will. The court held that plaintiff received a fee simple under the will
and that the restraint upon alienation was repugnant to the fee granted
and was void. The court stated that the executors were not designated
trustees of the land by virtue of the consent restraint in the will, but
rather the intention of the testator was to give the legal fee to plaintiff,
albeit subject to the invalid restriction upon the power to convey.
An intermediate appellate court in Ohio has given qualified ap-
proval to the consent restraint. In Ink v. Plotts plaintiff developer
conveyed Lot No. 8 in the development to defendant. The deed con-
tained this restrictive covenant: "[G]rantees agree that said Lot No. 8
shall not be leased or sublet or the possession of title passed, by deed or
otherwise, unless and until consent thereto is given by said owners of
Lots Nos. 7 and 9 .... -r9 The same type of restriction appeared in all
deeds in the development. Plaintiff brought an action to enjoin sale of
Lot 8 by defendant without the consent of plaintiff developer who still
held title to the adjoining lots. The appellate court affirmed a judg-
ment for plaintiff, stating:
Such covenants must be upheld if they are not absolutely void as
being against public policy. Third, this covenant is not against
public policy unless it is absolutely an interdiction against alien-
ation. A reasonable restraint on alienation is not interdicted. A
question of the reasonableness of withholding consent is not in-
volved herein.60
The court suggests that the arbitrary withholding of consent might not
be upheld, but the overwhelming majority of cases involving consent
restraints hold that the consent requirement is an unreasonable re-
05 Id. at 592, 116 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
56 257 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
57 Id. at 776.
5S 15 Ohio Op. 2d 199, 175 N.E2d 94 (Ct. App. 1960).
59 Id. at 200, 175 N.E.2d at 96.
6o Id. at 201, 175 N.E.2d at 97-98.
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straint and void, without regard to how it may be exercised. 1 There are
dicta in both consent cases and membership cases, however, that if the
discretion were required to be exercised within reasonable standards
which were expressly stated, the restraints might well be valid. Ink v.
Plott, on the other hand, validates the standardless restraint, and shifts
the question of validity to the manner of exercise.
Validity of the consent restraint has also been recognized in con-
nection with the transfer of the stock and proprietary lease in an
apartment cooperative. In Weisner v. 791 Park Avenue Corp.,62 plain-
tiff contracted with defendant for the sale of the latter's stock and
proprietary lease in an apartment cooperative. The contract of sale
provided that the sale was subject to the approval required under the
certificate of incorporation and bylaws of the corporation and the
terms of the proprietary lease. The lease provided in part:
The Lessee shall not assign this lease, or any interest therein,
and no such assignment shall take effect as against the Lessor for
any purpose, unless and until all of the following requirements
have been complied with and satisfied:
4. A written consent to such assignment, authorized by a resolu-
tion of the board of directors, or signed by a majority of the direc-
tors or by lessees owning of record at least two-thirds of the capital
stock of the Lessor accompanying proprietary leases then in force,
must be delivered to the Lessor. 3
Defendant could not obtain the necessary consent and refused to
consummate the sale. Plaintiff brought an action against the vendor
and the cooperative corporation for an injunction restraining assign-
61 E.g., Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 863, 28 P. 118 (1883); Cronk v. Shoup, 70 Colo. 71,
197 P. 756 (1921); Davis v. Geyer, 151 Fla. 362, 9 So. 2d 727 (1942); Johnson v. Flanders,
92 Ga. App. 697, 89 S.E.2d 829 (1955); Muhlke v. Tiedemann, 177 Ill. 606, 52 N.E. 843
(1899); Winn v. William, 292 Ky. 44, 165 S.W.2d 961 (1942); Smith v. Smith, 290 Mich.
143, 287 N.W. 411 (1939); In re Brower's Will, 25 Misc. 2d 482, 203 N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct.
1960); Pavlikowski v. Ehrhardt, 192 Pa. Super. 373, 161 A.2d 652 (1960); Manierre v.
Welling, 32 R.I. 104, 78 A. 507 (1911); Nashville, C. & S.L. Ry. v. Bell, 162 Tenn. 661, 39
S.W.2d 1026 (1931).
See, however, Feldman v. Urban Commercial, Inc., 70 NJ. Super. 463, 175 A.2d 683
(Ch. 1961), where a consent restraint in a deed from an urban redevelopment agency to
a private developer, which provided that the private developer was not to convey until
completion of all building in the redevelopment area without consent of the agency,
was held to be valid. This limited consent restraint would appear to have a valid social
purpose.
62 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959).
63 Id. at 431, 160 N.E2d at 722, 190 N.YS.2d at 73.
[Vol. 54:524-
CONTRACTUAL DEVICES
ment of the lease and sale of the corporate stock to others. The New
York Court of Appeals upheld the consent restraint:
The statute which prohibits discrimination in co-operatives
because of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry is not
involved in this case. Absent the application of these statutory
standards, and under the terms of the agreement between plaintiff
and Gilbert, there is no reason why the owners of the co-operative
apartment house could not decide for themselves with whom they
wish to share their elevators, their common halls and facilities,
their stockholders' meetings, their management problems and re-
sponsibilities and their homes.64
Certainly the apartment cooperative situation is distinctive be-
cause of sharing of financial responsibility. But the court does not
suggest that consent must be exercised in a reasonable manner. There
is an indication in an earlier New York case involving a restraint on
alienation in an apartment cooperative, however, that arbitrary with-
holding of consent might not be upheld.65 Also, the Court of Appeals
in Weisner did not base its decision on the ground that the restraint
was attached to a leasehold;66 clearly the proprietary lease is akin to a
fee and was dealt with accordingly. A recent case in the Seventh
Circuit6 7 held that a standardless consent restraint on alienation of
stock in an apartment cooperative and the proprietary lease therein,
such as obtained in the Weisner case, is deemed to include an
implied requirement that the consent discretion be exercised reason-
ably, and is valid. The court acknowledged that the cooperative apart-
ment situation involved intimate financial and social relationships
which justified a restraint relevant to such considerations.
There can be no doubt that the standardless consent restraint is
analytically no different from the promissory or forfeiture restraint
that does not provide expressly for consent. Where there is no consent
provision, the promisee or the holder of the future interest contingent
upon the transfer can always waive the breach. The law should treat
them alike, and it usually has done so. Psychologically there is little
64 Id. at 434, 160 N.E.2d at 724, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 75. For a similar holding, see 68
Beacon St., Inc. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935).
65 Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d
417 (1st Dep't 1939).
66 Promissory restraints on leaseholds are normally valid. 3 SimEs & SMrrH, supra
note 13, § 1158.
67 Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967).
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doubt that the owner feels more comfortable with a standardless con-
sent restraint than with a standardless restraint that does not provide
expressly for consent, but the legal effect in each case is the same.
C. Preemption Restraint
In Kershner v. Hurlburt6s the Supreme Court of Missouri was
confronted with the question of the validity of the preemption at a fixed
price. Plaintiff and one defendant owned adjoining land. They con-
tracted that if either decided to sell his land he would offer it first to
the other at the price paid for it, plus the value of any improvements
on the land subsequent to such purchase. The contracting defendant
sold to another defendant, and plaintiff brought an action for specific
performance of his contract. The supreme court affirmed dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint. The court construed the contract as being opera-
tive only during the lives of the parties, and consequently there was
no violation of the rule against perpetuities. The court reasoned with
respect to the rule against restraints on alienation:
The instant contract does not by its specific language consti-
tute any restraint upon alienation. This, because the contract
permits the conveyance of... the lots to any person, provided it is
first offered to the other parties at a stipulated price. Thus, a
method for alienation is provided. However, it appears that, by
reason of the inclusion of a stipulated price, the contract imposes
a substantial restraint on alienation. This, because if there oc-
curred a marked increase in the market value of the properties
between the time of the contract and the time when either of the
parties wished to sell, it is obvious that neither owner would sell.69
The court then adopted the view that validity of contracts re-
quiring an offer to a specified person at a fixed price before the prop-
erty may be sold to another depends entirely upon the purpose or
purposes to be accomplished by the particular contract. And since the
parties knew both that if the value of the lots substantially increased,
the owners of the lots would not offer their property to the owners of
the other property at the fixed price, and that if property value re-
mained stationary or decreased, they had obtained no substantial ad-
vantage by reason of the contract, they must have intended "to
arbitrarily restrain the alienation of the lots for the lives of the
respective parties." 70
68 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955).
69 Id. at 624 (emphasis in original).
70 Id. at 626. Similar holdings appear in Brace v. Black, 51 N.J. Super. 572, 144 A.2d
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In Neustadt v. Pearce71 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecti-
cut held a preemption restraint at market value invalid as violative of
the rule against perpetuities. Plaintiff's predecessor in title was the
developer of certain lands for residential purposes. The deed from the
developer to defendant's predecessor in title contained a covenant as
follows:
The grantor shall also have the right and privilege to repurchase
the above described premises in the event that the grantee desires
to sell the same, at a price which the grantee shall have been
offered for a sale and conveyance of the same premises. The con-
ditions above provided for are all part of the consideration of the
sale of the premises and the conveyance of same by the grantor,
and are binding upon the heirs, successors and assigns of the
parties hereto.72
Defendant put his property up for sale, and plaintiff tendered the
asking price and demanded a conveyance, but defendant refused.
Plaintiff then brought an action to restrain defendant from conveying
to anyone else without first offering to convey to plaintiff at the asking
price. The trial court held for defendant, and the Supreme Court
affirmed:
The decisive issue is whether the covenant giving the right to
repurchase is enforceable by these plaintiffs, Edwards' successors
in title to the original tract. The covenant purported to grant to
Edwards, his heirs, successors and assigns a continuing option, un-
limited as to time, to purchase the acreage originally sold to
Camille DeBarbac. It attempted to create a contingent interest
which might not vest until some uncertain date in the future....
.. . [The distinction between an option to repurchase for a
stated sum and a covenant for repurchase at market value] is super-
ficial and is not a valid one. It concerns only the degree to which
the option to repurchase operates and not the basic nature of the
interest which it creates. The covenant, though it does provide in
effect that the covenantee must pay the market price in order to
exercise his option, nevertheless creates a contingent future in-
terest, and, if valid, it would limit the power of any successor in
title to Camille DeBarbac to convey an absolute fee.73
385 (App. Div. 1958); McGaffey v. Walker, 379 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See
RrSTATEMrENT § 413.
Cases holding that the preemption at a fixed price is not an invalid direct restraint
on alienation are Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926); Hall v. Crocker,
192 Tenn. 506, 241 S.W.2d 548 (1951); Kamas State Bank v. Bourgeois, 14 Utah 2d 188,
380 P.2d 931 (1963).
71 145 Conn. 403, 143 A.2d 437 (1958).
72 Id. at 404, 143 A.2d at 437.
73 Id. at 405-06, 143 A.2d at 438. Other cases holding that preemptions are subject to
1969]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
A leading case upholding the Validity of the preemption at market
value is Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative.7 4 Plaintiff
nonprofit housing cooperative brought an action to compel the recon-
veyance to it of certain properties by its members. This was a coopera-
tive involving individual homes, as distinguished from the apartment
cooperative. The membership agreement provided that legal title to
all land was to be in the association, but that for the limited purpose of
enabling the member to obtain mortgage financing the association
would convey title to the landowner who would reconvey after obtain-
ing his financing. Defendants received title to the land from plaintiff
association for financing purposes and refused to reconvey. The de-
fense was essentially that the membership agreement was an illegal
restraint on alienation, and for that reason the provision for reconvey-
ance, which was one of its terms, was unenforceable. The restraints on
alienation in the membership agreement were of the preemption
variety. Each member had an interest in the association equal essen-
tially to the appraised value of his home and lot. If a member wished
to withdraw, he gave notice to the board of directors. The association
then had twelve months in which to purchase the membership at the
selling price fixed in the member's notice, the price that might be
agreed upon between the member and the association, or the price
determined by an impartial appraisal. The determination to purchase
at one of these prices was at the option of the association. If it did not
exercise its option in the twelve-month period, then the member could
sell his membership on the open market. If the transfer was approved
in advance, the transferee became a member. If the transferee was not
acceptable to the association, the association could redeem the mem-
bership at the appraised value of the home and lot within ninety days.
If the membership was not redeemed within that time, the transferee
became a member upon request.
the rule against perpetuities are Henderson v. Bell, 103 Kan. 422, 173 P. 1124 (1918);
Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 117 S.W.2d 568 (1944); Roberts v. Jones, 307 Mass. 504,
30 N.E.2d 392 (1940); Melcher v. Camp, 435 P.2d 107 (Okla. 1967); Concannon v. Haile,
81 Pa. D. & C. 480 (C.P. 1952); Kamas State Bank v. ]Bourgeois, 14 Utah 2d 188, 380 P.2d
931 (1963).
Options to purchase land, except the option to purchase held by the lessee, are generally
subject to the rule against perpetuities. The preemption has been treated in the same
manner since it is a special form of option. See 6 Am.cAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 24.56-.57.
Arguably a preemption at market price should not be subject to the rule against
perpetuities since it does not even indirectly impair alienability. See 6 AMRmucAN LAw oF
PROPERTY § 26.67; 3 SIMEs & SMrr § 1154. There is normally, however, a degree of
delay and inconvenience in connection with the preemption process. Also, the choice of
one's purchaser is an aspect of the dispositive power, just as much as the obtaining of
the price.
74 21 IMI. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 80 (1961).
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The trial court ordered the reconveyance, and the Supreme Court
of Illinois affirmed. In upholding this preemptive restraint system, the
Supreme Court of Illinois reasoned:
[T]he crucial inquiry should be directed at the utility of the re-
straint as compared with the injurious consequences that will flow
from its enforcement. If accepted social and economic considera-
tions dictate that a partial restraint is reasonably necessary for their
fullfillment, such a restraint should be sustained. No restraint
should be sustained simply because it is limited in time, or the
class of persons excluded is not total, or all modes of alienation are
not prohibited....
We are of the opinion that the utility of the restraints in this
agreement outweigh the injurious consequences to the public, if
any... The restrictions on transfer of a membership are reason-
ably necessary to the continued existence of the co-operative associ-
ation .... The member is not prevented from liquidating his
interest and therefore consuming the property. Creditors are not
prevented from satisfying their claims. Members are encouraged
to improve their homes and the value of any improvement will be
realized when they liquidate their interest.75
In the course of the opinion, the court noted that membership
in the plaintiff association was open to all persons, regardless of race,
color, or creed, who were in agreement with the aims of the association
and were able to comply with the bylaws of the association. It should
be noted that members in this cooperative financed the homes them-
selves. Financially, members were quite independent of one another.
However, there clearly was a desire to have congenial families without
regard to racial or religious considerations. The cooperative idea was
considered to justify the preemptive restraint at market value. There
was no mention of any perpetuities issue in the opinion.
In Beets v. Tyler,76 plaintiffs, holders of a preemption at market
value, brought an action for specific performance of their contractual
right of purchase against defendant landowner. One of the restrictive
covenants in the deed from the developer to purchasers read:
No sale of said lots shall be consummated without giving at least
fifteen days' written notice to Grantor [developer] and the owners
of the two lots adjoining said lot on the sides, of the terms thereof;
and any of them shall have the right to buy said lot on such
terms .... 77
Defendant contracted with another to sell land in the subdivision
and notified plaintiff. Plaintiff informed defendant that he was exer-
7S Id. at 92-93, 171 N.E.2d at 33-34.
78 365 Mo. 895, 290 S.W.2d 76 (1956).
77 Id. at 899, 290 S.W.2d at 79 (emphasis in original).
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cising his preemptive right to purchase on the same terms as provided
in the contract of sale but defendant refused to proceed with the sale
to plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Supreme
Court of Missouri reversed, holding that the complaint did state a
cause of action. The court upheld the preemption:
[T]he effect of a pre-emptive right to purchase, as a practical re-
straint on alienation, depends upon the manner of fixing the
price.... [A] pre-emption for a fixed price, without reference to
any future increase in value, might well operate as an unreasonable
restraint on alienation.... However, the instant provision in no
way restrained defendant from the free alienation of her land.
She could negotiate a sales contract at the highest price obtainable.
She merely had to offer to the Development Company and adjoin-
ing lot owners the prior right to buy upon the terms fixed. This
amounts to no more than a right in these interested parties to buy
the property at the market price whenever defendant decided to
sell. They could not force her to sell and she could not make them
buy... [T]he provision in question is no unreasonable restraint
on alienation.78
The court found no violation of the rule against perpetuities in
the preemption because the deeds provided that covenants were
limited in duration to twenty years, and could be renewed for an
additional period not to exceed twenty years by agreement of the
landowners.
In summary, the law with respect to the preemption at a fixed
price is divided on the question of its invalidity as a restraint on aliena-
tion.79 The textwriters adopt the view that it should be an invalid
restraint on alienation. 0 Of course, if it violates the rule against per-
petuities it fails although it is not considered to be violative of
the rule against restraints on alienation. The preemption at market
value, however, is generally held to be a valid restraint on alienation.
But it too may fail if it violates the rule against perpetuities.81
78 Id. at 902, 290 S.W.2d at 81. Other cases holding that the preemption at market
price is not an invalid direct restraint are Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.
1936); Blair v. Kingsley, 128 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961); In re Abbondondolo's Estate,
10 Misc. 2d 418, 168 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Sibley v. Hill, 31 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960).
79 Compare Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955), and Brace v. Black, 51
N.J. Super. 572, 144 A.2d 385 (App. Div. 1958), with Hall v. Crocker, 192 Tenn. 506, 241
S.W.2d 548 (1951), and Kamas State Bank v. Bourgeois, 14 Utah 2d 188, 380 P.2d 931 (1963).
80 See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.67; RESTATEMENT § 413; 3 Simas & SMrr
§ 1154.
81 The consent restraint with respect to the transfer of shares of corporate stock has




THE PREEMPTION IN THE RESIDENTIAL CONTEXT
The prevailing judicial view is that standardless consent and
membership restraints attached to fee interests are invalid. The pre-
emption at a fixed price has been held to be invalid, although there is
substantial authority to the contrary. The only contractual restrictive
device generally held to be valid is the preemption at market value,
so long as its duration is limited to the period of the rule against per-
petuities. Should the preemption, at market value or at a fixed price,
be held to be a reasonable restraint when it is employed for the pur-
pose of controlling who may live in a particular geographical area?
The preemptive right of purchase may perform a valid social function
in the context of commercial real estate transactions, but may not in
the context of residential development, and accordingly the different
uses may be legally distinguished.
The rationale for invalidity of the direct restraint upon alienation
is the social and economic undesirability of the impairment of transfer-
ability of property. It is frequently stated that the direct restraint is in-
valid because of its repugnance to the fee, but any such argument
founded upon the conceptual purity of the fee cannot be taken seri-
ously by those concerned with the functional value of law. In our
system of law, ownership may be defined as the protection afforded by
the state with respect to use and disposition. Ownership is qualified to
further certain social ends that are deemed of sufficient value to justify
interference with the owner's use and disposition. Some of these
qualifications are imposed directly by the state, such as laws regarding
nuisance, zoning, fair housing, dower, spouse's forced share, and per-
petuities. Other qualifications are the product of private action such
as covenants dealing with use and covenants or conditions imposing
what are considered to be reasonable restraints upon the owner's right
to sell his property. Judicial enforcement of these private arrangements
reflects the conclusion that the privately arrived at qualification is so-
cially desirable, or at least that the freedom of individuals to agree to
such qualification has social value outweighing the social detriment of
restricting the owner's freedom of use and disposition. When the judi-
ciary holds that the privately arrived at qualification is unenforceable,
it must be exercised reasonably. The preemption restraint with respect to shares of stock
has been upheld if it seems to serve a legitimate business purpose. 1 G. HORNSTEIN,




it is concluding not only that the qualification itself is socially harmful,
but also that the social interest in having individuals freely work out
their own property relationships is outweighed by the harm done by
such qualification upon property rights.
Refusal of the judiciary to enforce the agreement that the grantee
shall not sell for fifty years, or shall not sell without consent of
the grantor or some third party, produces the interesting result that
the transferor's power of disposition is qualified in order to give
the transferee a broader power of disposition than he would otherwise
have. The purpose of rules of law such as the rule against perpetuities,
suspension of the power of alienation, and direct restraints on aliena-
tion, is to make property that has been conveyed more readily and
easily transferable, and to achieve this end the dispositive aspect of
the property interest of the transferor of property is qualified. Clearly
our legal system places considerable value upon freedom of alienability
of property. The judicial bias in favor of free alienability had its
origin in the feudal period, and the justification for it does not appear
to have changed in its essentials for centuries.8 2 The courts have con-
sistently adopted the view that inability to transfer full title to property
over an extended period of time would have a deleterious effect upon
the socio-economic development of the community; the enterprising
members of society would be prevented from making the most produc-
tive use of property. As we have seen, a balance has been struck in this
regard by allowing direct restraints in certain circumstances where the
purpose of the restraint is judged to be of sufficient value to justify
permitting the adverse effects presumably resulting from the restraint.
The preemption at market price is a unique type of restraint on
alienation. In a sense it is not a restraint on alienation at all because
the owner gets his price either from the holder of the preemption or
from some third party; if one looks only to the question of getting the
market price when one wishes to sell, then no restraint exists, except
for the delay that may be involved in the exercise of the preemption.
But if one views selection of the buyer as an element of the dispositive
aspect of ownership, then alienation is restrained in the sense that the
owner is limited in the selection of his buyer. The question then is
whether such control over the owner's power to choose his own buyer
is sufficiently undesirable to warrant denial of enforcement by courts.
The judicial response has been negative to this question. But granting
82 See discussion in 6 AMERIcAN LAw or PROPERTY §§ 26.1-.5; 3 W. HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 73-87 (1942); 4 RESTATEMENT 2123-34; 3 SIMES & SMITH §§ 1114-17.
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that in circumstances involving commercial real estate such control
is acceptable, it is submitted that it is socially undesirable and unac-
ceptable when it is used to control who is to live in a particular neigh-
borhood.
To justify this position, a brief examination of the expanding
area of "social rights" is required. When we speak of the relationship
of the individual to the state, we think in terms of political rights-
freedom of speech, religion and assembly, freedom from self-incrimina-
tion, rights of due process, equal protection of the laws, and the like.
But we have come to realize that as essential as such political rights are,
the political health of our society cannot be sustained without recog-
nition that certain social and economic needs must also be guaranteed.
I refer to such needs as education, employment, housing, minimum
income, and access to public accomodations. Political freedom has
limited meaning to the person who cannot find employment, or who
has been afforded an education inadequate for the demands of our
society and economy, or who cannot house his family in a suitable
manner or environment.
Adequate living conditions mean, first and foremost, decent, clean,
and sizeable accommodations. But it means more than that. It means the
opportunity to live in a community or neighborhood of one's choice
if one can afford to buy there. Discrimination in housing also deprives
the person discriminated against of certain cultural, educational, social
and psychological benefits and opportunities that attach to neighbor-
hood and environment.
We have indicated that if the preemption in the residential con-
text is demonstrably employed as a racially or religiously discrimina-
tory device, it is unenforceable. But what is being suggested is that it
be considered as an unreasonable restraint upon alienation from the
property standpoint, regardless of whether it can be demonstrated
to be a discriminatory subterfuge. One should take notice that restric-
tive devices are frequently subterfuges to make it difficult for certain
racial, ethnic, and religious minorities to live in the neighborhood, and
that proof of a pattern of discrimination may involve such expense and
delay as to deter litigation and to encourage use of these restrictive
devices as a discriminatory subterfuge.
To declare that the preemption at market value in the residential
context is an unreasonable direct restraint on alienation would be a
modest extension of the doctrine. It is the only remaining device
generally recognized as valid from the property standpoint. In view
1969]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
of our national policy of equality of opportunity in housing, the judi-
ciary should do away with the preemption loophole that makes evasion
of this policy more easily attainable.
We have been discussing the preemption at market value which
is standardless. If the terms of the preemption in the residential de-
velopment provided that it could be exercised only in the event that the
prospective purchaser was unacceptable on some specifically stated
grounds reasonably related to the circumstances of the particular resi-




The preparation by a lawyer of a deed including a provision that
the grantee shall not sell without the consent of neighbors, or shall
not sell to anyone who is not a member of a particular club, or shall
offer for sale first to the grantor or a third party if the grantee decides
to sell, presents a problem of legal ethics in a jurisdiction in which the
specific terms of such a provision are unenforceable. Use of these
terms in such a jurisdiction can serve the purpose only of discouraging
or encouraging conduct that cannot legally be prevented or required.
Is the lawyer entitled to use such means in the service of his client?
The issue is compounded by the fact that the person whose conduct
is intended to be controlled by the provision is usually, or at least
frequently, not represented by counsel. The provision, which is usually
a covenant, may be set forth in the initial deed from the developer or
may be incorporated in such deed by reference to the recorded plat
in which the restrictions are enumerated, and such a covenant normally
will bind all subsequent owners of the land as a covenant running with
the land. The initial purchaser or the subsequent purchaser often
does not go to the expense of employing an attorney to represent him
in the purchase transaction, and does not know the legal effect of the
covenant restricting his right of sale, if in fact he is apprised at all
of such limitation at the time of his purchase. A convincing argument
can be made that knowledge of the attorney that the purchaser is
unlikely to be represented by counsel has a bearing upon his responsi-
bility to avoid use of provisions that have been held to be unenforce-
able as against public policy. 3
If the lawyer preparing the restrictive provision is aware that it
83 Canon 9 of the ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL EmIcs provides in part as follows:
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is to be used as a subterfuge for racial or religious discrimination, the
ethical issue is presented even with respect to a restrictive covenant
valid from the property standpoint. Canon 32 of the American Bar
Association Canons of Professional Ethics provides in part as follows:
No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any
cause, civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive,
nor should any lawyer render any service or advice involving dis-
loyalty to the law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judi-
cial office, which we are bound to uphold... or deception or be-
trayal of the public. When rendering any such improper service or
advice, the lawyer invites and merits stern and just condemnation.
He must also observe and advise his client to observe the
statute law, though until a statute shall have been construed and
interpreted by competent adjudication, he is free and is entitled to
advise as to its validity and as to what he conscientiously believes
to be its just meaning and extent .... 84
In 1948, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York issued
the following opinion:
You inquire if it is ethical for a lawyer to insert in a contract
a waiver of a right, which waiver is void "as against public policy."
You state that the right in question is a tenant's right to a
sixty-day period to reconsider and cancel an agreed upon increase
of rent under the Emergency Rent Laws. You further stated that
many times a layman does not know his rights and could be de-
ceived into compliance by such an illegal clause.
In the opinion of our Committee it is not within the proper
standards of ethics for a lawyer to insert such a waiver in a con-
tract if the lawyer knows that such a waiver is against public policy
and void as a matter of law.
A lawyer must himself observe and advise his client to observe
the statute law (Canon 82). If a waiver in a contract has been
held by a court of last resort to be void as against public policy
as a matter of law, he should so advise his client. If the client
should nevertheless insist on its incorporation in the contract,
the lawyer should refuse to do so, for if he should comply with
his client's request he would thereby become a party to possible
deception of the other party to the contract.
In the language of Canon 29 as to the lawyer's duty to uphold
the honor of the profession, "He should strive at all times to up-
hold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and
to improve not only the law but the administration of justice."8 5
". It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may
tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel ... 
84 ABA CANONS OF PRoFEssIoNAL ETHIcs No. 32.
85 Ass'x OF THE BAR OF THE CrrY OF NEw YORK AND THE NEW YORK CouNTY
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There seems little doubt that inclusion in a deed of a restrictive cove-
nant known to have been held by the highest court of the jurisdiction
to be against public policy and unenforceable is a violation of Canon
32. If the lawyer is enjoined to demonstrate loyalty to the law and to
avoid deception of the public, then he certainly breaches Canon 32
when he inserts an illegal covenant which is included for the purpose
of discouraging or encouraging conduct that cannot legally be con-
trolled.
It should be stressed that the lawyer is not in violation of Canon
32 when he includes any such provision in a jurisdiction in which the
legal validity thereof has not been determined by the highest court.
And certainly if there are special circumstances raising the reasonable
possibility that the restrictive provision may be valid in the context of
the transaction in question, the lawyer is not remiss in his ethical duty
if he includes it.
CONCLUSION
If the selling homeowner desires to comply with laws forbidding
discrimination, and is made aware that the covenant that calls for
neighbor approval of the prospective purchaser is illegal, or that the
covenant that requires association membership for the prospective
purchaser is illegal, then hopefully he will be encouraged to sell to
the "undesirable" without complying with the terms of the covenant.
One action by a knowledgeable homeowner to quiet title or for a
declaratory judgment on the unenforceability of the covenant could
have the effect of informing the community that the right to sell is
unfettered. The psychological impact could be considerable.
The cases suggest that the property invalidity of some of these
covenants may be overcome by establishing reasonable standards for
granting membership or withholding consent. For example, standards
could be set in economic or cultural terms. If this were to be done,
opportunity for discriminatory control would still exist. It would,
however, be somewhat more difficult to discriminate by subterfuge.
It is hoped that those courts that have accepted certain forms of
residential alienability restrictions will reexamine their conclusions
in the light of our racial troubles and the national policy against
discrimination in housing. And certainly lawyers should reexamine the
propriety of their complicity in the use of illegal restrictive devices.
LAWYERs ASS'N, COMA. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 435-36
(1956) (Op. No. 722, Dec. 6, 1948).
